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NON-COERCIVE INTERROGATION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF MIRANDA ON POLICE EFFECTUALITY
JAMES W. WITT*
Possibly the most significant and pressing
problem currently confronting constitutional
government in the United States is the necessity
to effect a balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of society. Nowhere is this
problem more obvious than in the conflict surrounding recent applications by the courts of the
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the criminal accused.
Much of the current debate over the rules protecting the rights of suspects against self-incrimination swirls around the controversial Escobedo'
and Miranaa2 decisions. Countless negative allegations, regarding the impact of these rulings on
law enforcement and crime in general, have been
circulated by spokesmen both in and out of law
enforcement. Since most of these allegations have
no foundation in fact, this study is designed to
empirically examine the impact that Miranda
has had on the effectiveness of one western police
department. This writer has made an effort to
deal with this topic both from the theoretical
viewpoint of a scholar and the practical viewpoint
of a former police officer. The main conclusion to
be drawn from this study is that the Miranda
decision does not appear to have had a significant
impact upon that effectiveness.
Most of the concern over the Miranda decision
emanates from the belief that the ruling has had
a detrimental impact upon police interrogation
procedures directly and police effectiveness indirectly. The problem of what constitutes proper
police interrogation practices in a democratic
society is not new.
BACKGROUND

Historically, the revulsion against police interrogation was spawned from the displeasure
caused by judicial inquisition in political cases.3
Interrogation has become a police function for* Head, Department of Criminal Justice, Armstrong
State College.
I Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3Wigmore, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination:

Its History, 15 HARv. L. REv. 610 (1902).

tuitously and it has never been legally sanctioned. 4
However, even without legalization, questioning
has been felt by some authorities to be "an indispensable instrumentality of justice."5 Due to
the increasing Supreme Court supervision over
state police interrogation practices, one of the
most perplexing and contentious questions in
American criminal procedure has evolved-should
law enforcement authorities be permitted to
utilize post-arrest questioning?
The arguments championing the elimination of,
or the placing of vigorous restraints upon, postarrest questioning seem to rest upon several interrelated premises. Some writers hold the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to be more important
than any reduction of police efficiency caused by
restrictions on police interrogation. 6 Other writers
examine the psychological aspects of post-arrest
questioning and conclude that the safeguards
provided by recent Supreme Court decisions are
almost futile.? These writers appear to be making
a case for the complete elimination of post-arrest
questioning. However, one writer finds the psychological aspects of incommunicado interrogation
to be less damaging to one's mental health than
the stresses of everyday life. 8 A few authorities
expound the virtues of the modern scientific techiques for detection, which they feel should
preclude the need for any questioning in many
4

MAYERS, STsAT

mENT?
5

87 (1959).

Wx AENwN THE Firm AmEND-

See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160
(1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
6
See Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 51 J. Cami. L. C. & P.S. 37
(1961). See also Kamisar, What Is An "Involuntary"
Confession?, 17 RUTGERs L. REv. 732 (1963); Pye,
The Supreme Court and the Police: Fact and Fiction, 57
J.Cm. L. C. & P.S. 405 (1966); Schaefer, Federalism
and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAav. L. REv. 26
(1956); Vorenberg, Police Detention and Interrogation
of Uncounselled Suspects: The Supreme Court and the
States,
44 B.U.L. REv. 425 (1964).
7
See, e.g., Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HA.tv. L. REv. 59 (1968); Rothblatt & Piter, Police Interrogation: Warnings and
Waiver-Where Do We Gofrom Here?, 42 NoTRE DAsix
LAW. 494 (1967).
8Marx, Psychosomatics and Coerced Confessions, 57
Dimo. L. REv. 1 (1952).
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cases.9 Seemingly their rationale is that, in most
cases, the utilization of modem investigative
techniques should cause the arrest to take place,
only after the investigation produces sufficient
evidence to sustain it. Finally, others recognize
that police interrogation is an established practice
but they perceive its dangers. This group advocates
that interrogation be used under controlled conditions' 0
Support for those advocating the necessity of
post-arrest questioning can be found in preMiranda decisions relative to confessions u in the
argument that it serves as a means for innocent
suspects to clear themselves,"2 and in its utility for
averting a breakdown of the trial court system."3
Generally, the most prevalent justification for
this position rests in the contention that it is
necessary for effective law enforcement in modem
urban life.' 4 This position, which is rooted in the
concept of police efficiency and the general social
utility of post-arrest questioning, claims many
6
15
adherentS as well as critics.'

In contrast to the antagonists of post-arrest
interrogation, the protagonists seem to reason
that a stable and safe society is dependent upon
an efficient police department. Therefore, some
sacrifices of individual rights and liberties must
be made in order to achieve this end. Also intertwined with this rationale is the assumpti6n that
"men with honest motives and purposes do not
remain silent when their honor is assailed."' 7
To all appearances, most of the above arguments
fail to surpass the narrow bounds of emotion.
Therefore, it is imperative that such an important
issue be subjected to empirical analysis.
METHODOLOGY

'See, e.g., Hughes, Confessions and Their Uncer-

Upon examining the literature during the initial
phase of this study, the author found that very
little reliable data were available regarding the
behavior and attitudes of law enforcement officers
or their interrogation procedures. There are no
dissertations dealing with the topic. Since 1965,
there have been several published studies, of
varying degrees of sophistication, analyzing the

The Law Relating to Police InterrogationPrivileges and

effects of either the Escobedo or Miranda decisions

Limitations,52 J. Cam. L. C. & P.S. 2 (1961).
10See Pound, Legal Interrogationof Persons Accused

on law enforcement;s however, most of these
studies are preoccupied with the impact of these
decisions on obtaining confessions, rather than
the interrogation process 9 From those studies
dealing with police interrogation procedures, the

tainty, 14 LoYorLA L. REv. 173 (1967-1968); Mueller,

or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRas. L. & C. 1017 (1934)

where the author advocated questioning in the presence
of counsel before a magistrate as a solution to the excesses of post-arrest questioning. It is interesting to
note that Pound, too, was writing at a time when "law
and order" was a major issue in the United States.
Realizing the futility of trying to fortify the rights of
criminals during this period, Pound's solution was to
eliminate the justification for illegal interrogation, i.e.,
to preserve law and order by substituting a procedure
that offered safeguards for the accused.
" See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441
(1958); Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 509 (1958).

(1968); Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police Prosecution
Oriented Critics of the Court, 49 CoRNr L. Q. 436

"See Robinson, Massiah, Escobedo, and Rationales
for the Exclusion of Confessions, 56 J.CaRs. L. C. &

(1964).
7U. S. v. Mammoth Oil Co., 14 F.2d 705, 729 (8th
Cir. 1926).
"8See, e.g., N. SOBEL, TE NEW CoNFEssIoN STANDARns 140-151 (1966); a statistical study dealing with
the impact of the Escobedo decision upon the confession
rate of the Detroit Police Department in Souris, Stop

P.S. 459 (1965).
"1Barrett brings out this point in Police Practicesand

Euphemisms, 57 J.Cams. L. C. & P.S. 263-64 (1966);

the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CAsaj.

L. Rav. 45 (1952).

and Frisk or Arrest and Search-the Use and Misuse of
Younger, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants-Some
Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FopanAif L. REv.

"See, e.g., Inbau, Police Interrogatim-A Practical

255 (1966). See also Medalie, Zeitz and Alexander, Cus-

Necessity, 52 J.Cans. L. C. & P.S. 16 (1961) as an
illustration of the most prolific proponent of this argument.
"6Some who have taken this position include Bator &

todial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The
Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MzcH. L. REv. 1347
(1968); Robinson, Police and ProsecutorPractices and
Attitndes Relating to Interrogation as Revealed by Preand Post-Miranda Questionnaires, 1968 DuxE L..

Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogationand the Right
to Counsel, 66 COLum. L. REv. 62 (1966); Craig, To
Police the Judges-Not Just Judge the Police, 57 J.

CR.m L.C. & P.S. 305 (1966); Kuh, The "Rest of Us"
in the "Policing the Police" Controversy, 57 J. Cans. L.,

C. & P.S. 244 (1966); Thompson, The Supreme Court
and the Police: 1968, 57 J.CRm. L. C. & P.S. 419
(1966); Williams, Police Interrogation Privileges and
Limitations under Foreign Law: England, 52 J. Cans.

L. C. & P.S. 50 (1961).

16See, e.g., Craig, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions: The Ethical Imperative, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 173

425 (1968); Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1
(1967); Comment, Interrogation and the Criminal
Process, 374 ANNALS 47 (1967); Comment, Interrogation in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE

L. J. 1641 (1967).
9The New Haven Study and the studies by Robinson and that of Medalie, Zetiz and Alexander are those
dealing in some respect with the impact of court decisions upon police interrogation procedures. See note
18 supra.
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author.was able to avail himself of a pre-tested
questionnaire. and some tried methods of analysis.
In order to test for police effectiveness, it was
necessary to tap information contained in police
files. Normally, this source is unavailable to social
scientists; however, being a former police officer
the writer was able to gain access to the files of a
West Coast police department. The Chief of the
department in question, a former supervisor of
the writer, was gracious enough to open his department's files to the author. However, he requested that the department not be identified in
the study, hence the pseudonym "Seaside City."
Seaside City, California, is an eight-square-mile
enclave in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, with
a population of 83,249 at the time this study was
effected.20 Only 6.2 per cent of the population is
nonwhite,R and the median income is $6,845 per
year.n2 Educationally, the residents average 12.3
years of completed school work and 57.3 per cent
finished high school.2
Although principally a residential community,
a major aircraft manufacturing facility and numerous small manufacturing firms and subcontracting firms are located within its city limits.
The University of California at Los Angeles is
situated near enough to make Seaside City an
attractive place for many academicians to reside.
A large urban renewal program has been instrumental in clearing away some of the worst slums
in the beach area of Seaside City. These slums
have been replaced by luxury high rise apartments.
Since Seaside City is a semitropical beach city
located within a major metropolitan area, law
enforcement is a complex business. Nearly 12
million people visit its beach recreation areas
every year, and its location makes it an attractive
place for social undesirables to congregate. Consequently, there has been a steady rise in Seaside
City's "Crime Index" 21 over the past five years20 1 UNTE=

STATEs BUREAU or TirE CENsus, UNITED

STATEs CENsus or PopuLAn-oN: 1960 1-72 (1963),
passim.
2. Id. at 1-184.
' Id. at 1-341.
2Id. at 1-337. All of the above figures are higher
than the national median for cities in the same category
as Seaside City.
24 See Seaside City's ANmuAL REPoRT-1967-68, 6
(1968).
21 Seven. crimes-murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny ($50.00 and over
in value) and auto theft-are used by the FBI as an
index to measure crime. See CRIME iN =H UNTED
STATEs,'UNIFOR
CRIu
REPORTS 4 (1969).
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a rise that has kept it in the upper five per cent of
the cities of comparable size.
Due to the geographic location of Seaside City,
the make-up of its residents, and the fine quality
of police employed by the city, its crime patterns
will not resemble those of other cities of comparable size; therefore, one should be very cautious
about drawing generalizations from this study
and applying them to cities of comparable size.
Tnn DEPARTMENT

At the time of this study, there were 128 police
officers in Seaside City, exclusive of 39 civilian
employees. These men were organized into three
divisions-investigation, uniform and staff services.
Twenty-five of the officers were assigned to the
detective bureau and three to the vice squad. The
department was under the supervision of a chief,
who could be categorized as a progressive "oldtimer."
Although the department's salaries and benefits
were higher than the national average for municipal police officers, the department experienced a
high rate of personnel turnover. This was probably
due to the attractive opportunities available in
private industry in Southern California. In order
to offset this situation, the department had instituted a 'Tolice Cadet" program 0 and a helicopter patrol.
Since this study is basic in nature,, no attempt
will be made to test precise assumptions. Only
tests of general assumptions will be made. The
assumptions to be tested are, on the one hand,
that the Miranda decision has hindered police
effectiveness, and, on the other, that it has not.
From numerous casual discussions with law enforcement officers, materials from* other studies,
and the media, it was ascertained that police
officers felt that the Miranda decision was
adversely affecting them in five areas: (1) in the
outcome of formal interrogation, (2) in the collateral functions of interrogation, (3) in the amount
of stolen property recovered, (4) in their conviction rate, and (5) in their clearance rate. Therefore, these five assumptions will be tested as a
measure of police effectiveness. Before testing
these assumptions, an attempt will be made to
ascertain the police's evaluation of the importance
28Under this program, college students, 18-25 years
of age, are paid to work under the supervision of veteran
officers at a multiplicity of assignments. When the
cadet reaches the age of 21 and/or has enough college
credits, he can qualify to become a regular police officer.
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of interrogation and determine the need for interrogation.
In order to test these former suppositions, data
were obtained from the ifies of the Seaside City
Police Department. Due to limited time and
resources, only cases dealing with murder, forcible
rape, robbery27 and burglary were utilized in this
study. It would have been desirable to have used
data predating 1964, but all files prior to that
data were unavailable. The area of inquiry was
further narrowed by using only those cases in
which suspects were actually arrested and incarcerated by the Seaside City Police Department. This eliminated all cases in which suspects
were detained for questioning but never incarcerated. As the result of this elimination process,
478 cases remained to comprise the sample. Each
of these cases was read and analyzed by the author
who, in many cases, used analytical methods
gleaned from the New Haven Study."
The author fully recognizes the problems involved in trying to prove a causal relationship
between Miranda and the various assumptions
to be tested; however, this does not preclude the
establishment of trends. This study differs from
those cited above in that more assumptions are
tested and, whenever possible, comparisons are
made with other studies. The general working
hypothesis of this study was that police effectiveness was being impaired by the Miranda decision.
It was further anticipated that a high degree of
negative impact would be found when each of the
above assumptions were tested.

Th SEsmE CITY STDY
In the wake of the Supreme Court decisions
limiting police interrogation came utterances by
scholars, 9 police officials and prosecutors" and
jurists" portending a foreboding future for law
enforcement. Most of these observers discerned
a correlation between police interrogation and
effective law enforcement. Sparse reliable in27This does not include cases of strong-arm robberies
where one juvenile robbed another.
2See Interrogationin New Haven, supra note 18.
29See Inbau, supra note 14.
30See, e.g., the N. Y. Times, August 22, 1964, at 23,
col. 5; N. Y. Times, May 14, 1965, at 39, col. 1; N. Y.
Times, September 10, 1965, at 1, col. 1; N. Y. Times,
November 27, 1965, at 1, col. 1; N. Y. Times, January
24, 1966, at 35, col. 1; N. Y. Times, July 23, 1966, at
54, col. 5; N. Y. Times, August 6, 1966, at 9, col. 2.
"tSee, e.g., critical remarks made by an appellate
court judge in N. Y. Times, August 6, 1966, at 9, col. 2;
English, Lawyers in the Station House? 57 J. Cgnr. L.
C. & P.S. 283 (1966).

formation was offered by any of these critics to
support their grim premonitions.
In order to ascertain the degree of importance
placed upon interrogation by investigative personnel in the Los Angeles area,2 forty-three detectives were asked to respond to the following
question: "Are there ways in which investigation
could possibly replace interrogation as a means
for crime solution?"" The responses to the question, which is similar to the one responded to in
the New Haven Study, compare favorably with
those obtained by the New Haven interviewers,
even though differences in approach make it
difficult to compare the data in the immediate
undertaking with those of other germane studies.
In the New Haven Study 71 per cent of a sample of 21 detectives felt that interrogation was
indispensable, 19 per cent thought that it was
not absolutely necessary for effective law enforcement, but it would be too costly to replace, and
10 per cent felt that the elimination of interrogation
would not impede their work. 4
Therefore, when asked abstractly, the results
indicate that the respondents in the immediate
study perceived interrogation to be necessary for
effective law enforcement.5
THE CoRRELATIoN BETwEEN INTERROGATION
N Rm SOLUTION
In order to collate surety with reality, i.e.,
determine whether interrogation is essential to
1"
Only veteran detectives, who had been same prior
to the Escobedo decision in 1964, were utilized in this
portion of the study in order to secure a more valid
perspective of the problem.
"Since the Seaside City Police Department did not
have an adequate number of personnel that could
qualify as respondents, detectives froi the Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department were utilized in this portion of
the study. This does not seem to present a methodological problem because of the following: (a) the departments have adjacent jurisdictions that overlap in
some instances, .(b) the crime problem is the same in
the three jurisdictions, i.e., major metropolitan crime,
(c) the caliber of personnel appears to be the same, and
(d) these personnel are equally well trained.
"'The respondents in both studies perceiving an absolute need for interrogation differed in their reasons.
In the New Haven Study 54 per cent thought interrogation was necessary due to the lack of evidence in many
cases and 46 per cent saw its need resting in its complemental effects. See New Haven Study, supra note
18, at 1592, note 195. Cf. Table 1.
35It should be noted that during the interviews none
of the respondents criticized the courts for excluding
involuntary confessions. Their primary concerns were
that legal interrogation procedures were being emasculated and that interrogation might be completely eliminated in the future.
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TABLE 1
DETECTIVE EVALUATION OF THE IMPORTANCE
OF INTERROGATION
Seaside
City Study
(N= 43)

Evaluation

No alternate methods could substitute for
interrogation
1. Interrogation compliments other investigative methods and there can be
no substitutions
2. In many cases evidence does not exist
Interrogation not absolutely necessary but
other means are too costly in terms of
time and resources
Interrogation could be eliminated without
loss to law enforcement

No.

%

28

65

20

72

8
12

28
28

3

7

43

100

and the court system. On the basis of these data,
the need for interrogation was categorized as
being "essential", "important", "not important",
or "unnecessary"P. The number of "essential"
and "important" interrogations should be one
indicator of the importance of interrogation to
the solution of the specific crime for which the
suspect is accused. It should be recognized that
interrogation has other uses than merely solving
crimes. These uses will be examined later.
Table 2 indicates that interrogation was found
to be "necessary", i.e., "essential" or "important",
in only 24 per cent of the cases reviewed. Generally,
the figures in Table 2 compare favorably with
those in the New Haven Study, where interrogation was deemed "necessary" in only 13 per cent
of the cases, "not important" in 9 per cent, and
39

"unnecessary" in 77 per cent of all cases.

After taking into account the possible bias
involved in gathering the data, it appears that in
most cases interrogation was not needed to solve
the immediate crimes for which the suspects were

TABLE 2
NEED FOR INTERROGATION

accused. 0 Hence, if the respondents were referring
to crime in general when they equated the necessity

N = 478 Cases

Interrogation
Interrogation
Interrogation
Interrogation

essential
important
not important
unnecessary

No.

%

75
38
40
325

16
8
8
68

478

100

the solution of most crimes, an examination was
made of 478 fies from the Seaside City Police
Department. Each of the 478 cases was read and
analyzed by the author, who, in most cases, utilized
analytical methods gleaned from the New Haven
38
Study.
Using the "Evidence-Investigation Scale" set
forth in the New Haven Study,37 a judgment
was made regarding the amount of evidence available in each case for a conviction. Admittedly,
the danger involved when a researcher attempts
to assume the role of judge and jury is immense.
However, judgment in this instance was fortified
by the researcher's seven years of police experience and his numerous years of studying the law
11See Interrogationin New Haven, supra note 18.
17Id. at 1582-1588.

n Interrogation was deemed "essential" if there appeared to be no physical evidence, witnesses or other
investigative substitutes; "important" if there were
some small leads, but very little other evidence; "not
important" if a sizable amount of evidence existed for
conviction or little difficulty was foreseen in securing
same; and "unnecessary" if the evidence seemed to
exist overwhelmingly against the suspect. See the New
Haven Study, supra note 18, at 1583-1584.
3 Interrogationin New Haven, supra note 18, at 1585.

The 11 per cent difference in the finding relative to the
"necessity" to interrogate may be due to the writer's
bias, when analyzing his data. Due to the court's current preoccupation with the accused's civil rights and
the difficulties involved in predicting the amount of
evidence needed for conviction, there probably was a
tendency by the writer to overestimate the amount of
evidence needed for conviction in some cases. In a field
patrol setting, the results of the President's Crime Commission Study revealed that in all of the 30 felony arrests observed, there was enough evidence for arrest
without the need for field interrogation. Reiss and
Black supra note 18, at 56. In an examination of 47
murder, burglary and robbery cases, Sobel found that
confessions secured through interrogation were "essential" or "helpful" in only 21 per cent of the cases. See

supra note 18, at 146.
Sobel,
4
0 Any comparisons drawn between the findings in
the New Haven Study and the immediate study must
be guarded, due to the quality of the personnel interviewed and the crime problem in each jurisdiction.
Based upon the New Haven Study's observations as
compared with the writer's, the Seaside City personnel
would appear to be more professionalized. Also, the
New Haven police are not confronted with the same
crime problems as those encountered by departments
in large metropolitan areas.
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TABLE 3
OuTcoME OF FORMAL INTERROGATION (MtfURDER, FORCIBLE RPE, ROBBERY, BURGLARY)
1965
(N - 80)

1964
(N= 105)

1966
(N = 69)

1967
(N = 104)

1968
(N =120)

Outcome

No.
Suspect not questioned
Suspect refused to talk
6
Interrogation unproductive
27
Signed confession
7
Oral admission of guilt
40
Signed statement
3
Oral incriminating evidence
19
Insufficient data
2
Interrogation productive but form 1
unknown
105
% cases questioning unsuccessful

% No.

%

No.

1
5
18
6
38
1
8
1
2

1
6
23
8
48
1
10
1
3

3
3
7
4
38

4
7
10
6
55

10
1
1

15
1
1

6
26
7
38
3
18
2
1

101* 80
67

101* 69
70

% No.

PostMirnda
254)
(N

% No.

%

No.

% No.

%

1
10
19
1
43

1
10
18
1
41

30

29

16
8
16
2
35
2
22

4
14
49
17
96
4
33
3
4

2 20
6 22
22 41
8
3
43 105
2
2
15 60
1
1
2

8
9
16
1
41
1
24
1

101* 224

101* 254

101*

19
10
19
2
42
2
26

99* 104 100 120
77

Pre(iranda
224)
(N

71

61

69

67

* Percentages might not total 100 due to rounding.

to interrogate with the solution of crimes, their
assumptions are not supported by the above data.
OuTcom oF FORMAL INTERROGATION

The respondents were in almost complete agreement over the effect that the Miranda warnings
were having on the outputs of formal interrogation.
Most believed that they were getting many fewer
confessions, admissions and statements. Hence,

one could assume that since the police have been
required to fulfill the Mirandarequirements, there
has been a considerable decrease in the quantity of
confessions, admissions and statements being obtained by law enforcement officers.
In order to test this assumption, a comparison
was made between the various outputs of formal
interrogation prior to the Seaside City Police
Department's compliance with the Miranda
dictum and the outputs subsequent to the com-

pliance. For the purposes of this comparison, July
1, 1966 was the date when the Seaside City detectives began to observe the Miranda precepts.4

11In January of 1965, a ruling by the California
Supreme Court, in the case of People v. Dorado, 398
P.2d 361 (1965), expanded the scope of the Escobedo decision in California. Dorado required the police
to advise a suspect of his right to counsel before interrogating him. Even though the California police were
restrained more than police in other jurisdictions by
this ruling, most officers agreed that their chances for
useful interrogation were not significantly impaired by
Dorado. Since the respondent's principal complaints
were directed toward Miranda, the date when it took
effect was used for this comparison.

The figures in Table 312 reveal that questioning
was successful" in 69 per cent of the cases before
complying with the Miranda requirements, and
in 67 per cent of the cases after compliance. There
was a drop of 7 per cent in the number of signed
confessions after compliance, but this figure is
inconclusive due to procedures followed by the

Seaside City detectives."
Another comparison of some consequence can
be made between the pre-Miranda year of 1964
and the post-Miranda year of 1967-years in which
the arrest rate was almost the same. In 1964, 67
per cent of the interrogations were successful, as
compared with 71 per cent in 1967. Furthermore,
the police were able to secure oral admissions of
41Table 3 is a modified version of a table used in the
New Haven Study, supra note 18, at 1589, n. 184.
4"Successful" as used in this context means that
the police were able to get a signed confession, an oral
admission of guilt, a signed incriminating statement or
some type of oral incriminating evidence or other useful
material for conviction through interrogation.
44From the files, it was impossible to make any determination regarding Miranda'simpact on the Seaside
City police's ability to secure signed statements or
confessions. This material was not appended to the reports. Although it is the department's policy to secure a
signed statement whenever possible, the reports did not
reflect that this policy was being followed. From conversations with the detectives, it was obvious that since
Mirandaand the court's preoccupation with procedural
matters, they do not want to question suspects in cases

where they have enough evidence to convict without
interrogation. The human factor is probably involved
here, too, in that unenterprising detectives can now
rationalize their indolence.

JAMES W. WITT
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
,OuTcoME

or

FoExAL INTERROGATION (MunDER, FoRcIBLE RAPE, ROBBERY, BURGLARY)
1966
Outcome

Pre-Miranda (N = 39)
NO.

Suspect not questioned
Suspect refused to talk
Interrogation unproductive
Signed confession
Oral admission of guilt
Signed statement
Oral incriminating evidence
Insufficient data
Interrogation productive but form unknown

% cases questioning successful
guilt in only 38 per cent of the cases before complying with Miranda, but were able to get the
same evidence in 41 per cent of the cases after
compliance. It should also be noted that prior to
compliance with the Miranda precepts, 18 per
cent of the suspects interrogated incriminated
themselves. However, after compliance, 29 per
cent performed the same act.
A Comparison of the percentage of cases, in
which interrogation was successful by years,
reveals that the percentage had dropped 16 per
cent since the peak year of 1966-from 77 per
5
cent in 1966 to 61 per cent in 1968 However, one
would be hard pressed to try to attribute this
decline to Mirandabecause, as the figures in Table
3 indicate, there were no attempts made to interrogate 16 per cent of the suspects in 1968. One
would seem to be on firmer ground in holding
that Miranda had an indirect effect on successful
interrogation.
Table 3 also reveals that more suspects were
refusing to talk to the police. Again, this could be
due to Miranda; however, due to the small percentage of increase in this figure, it would seem
that there could be a more plausible answer. This
increase may simply be the result of enlarged
publicity via the mass media or verbally from
4
1It is noteworthy that from January through June,
1966, i.e., before the Miranda requirements took effect,
the police were successful in 74 per cent of their interrogations. However, after initiating their warning procedure in July, they were successful in 80 per cent of
their interrogations for the remainder of the year.

3
3
4
4
18

Post-Mranda (N = 30)
No.

%

8
8
10
10
15
46

6
1

3

39

100
74

confidants and others through which suspects have
been made more aware of their rights.
Generally speaking, the above assumption does
not seem to be supported by the data. There is
little indication from the above data that the
Miranda requirements have materially affected
the outcome of formal police interrogation in
Seaside City. Although different approaches were
used, the findings of some of the other interrogation
studies lend support to this conclusion. 6
COLLATERAL FUNcTIONS OF INTERROGATION

When responding to the question, "In what
ways besides getting evidence for trial is the information from interrogation used?" the interviewees cites several collateral functions performed by the interrogation process. a Most respondents were quick to point out that the performance of these functions had been considerably
impeded by the Miranda decision. Hence, the
assumption that interrogation provides the means
46
After Escobedo, the Detroit Study recorded a mere
2.8 per cent drop in the confession rate. Souris, s=pra
note 18, at 1573. The New Haven Study registered a
"10 to 15 per cent" decline in the number of suspects
giving incriminating evidence, supra note 18, at 1573.
However, the New Haven researchers attributed this
decline to factors other than Miranda.Id. at 1563. The
Pittsburgh Study discovered a 16.9 per cent drop in the
confession rate subsequent to Miranda and attributed
this decline largely to Mirandae Seeburger and Wettick,
supra
47 note 18, at 11.
Table 4 is a slightly modified version of its counterpart in the New Haven Study. Interrogation in Newa
Haven, supranote 18, at 1593 n. 197.
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by which several important collateral functions
needed for effective law enforcement are fulfilled.
Since the Miranda decision, these functions have
been seriously curtailed in Seaside City.
In looking at Table 5, one perceives that the
police were able to obtain additional information
in four important areas as the result of interrogation. In a five-year span, the police were able to
implicate accomplices in 12 per cent of the in49
8
terrogations1 solve other crimes in 18 per cent
recover stolen property in 10 per cent, and help
suspects clear themselves in 15 per cent of the
cases50 where post-custodial questioning was
utilized.
The interesting figures in Table 5 are those
depicting the decline in the percentage rate of the
instances in which the police were getting collateral
results from interrogation. This decline is accompanied by a parallel increase in the percentage of
cases in which no collateral results were being obtained. The reasons listed above for the decline in
the rate of successful cases of interrogation might
well apply here, but it might well be the case that
Miranda has had an adverse impact on these
figures. For example, the Seaside City detectives
did not significantly curtail their efforts to interrogate suspects until 1968.5 Yet, as Table 5
indicates, in the year following Miranda there
was a 2 per cent drop in instances of accomplice
implication, a 10 per cent decrease in the crime
clearance figures, and a 3 per cent decline in cases
where stolen property was recovered through
interrogation. Prior to Miranda, there had been a
steady increase in these figures.
Table 5 reveals that interrogation has furnished
some important collateral benefits for law enforcement in Seaside City and that there has been
a diminution of these benefits since the Miranda
decision. Therefore, it would appear that the above
48The results of the New Haven Study indicate that
interrogation helped the New Haven police to identify
or implicate accomplices in 27 out of 90 cases, or 30 per
cent of the time; however, they downgrade these results.
Interrogationin New Haven, supra note 18, at 1593-94.
49The New Haven researchers found that interrogation was instrumental in clearing 12 unsolved crimes or
"... 10 to 15% of all crimes investigated..." during
their study. Id. at 1595 n.203. The clearance rate variable is one that is open to serious questions as to its
utility. This will be discussed further, when the clearance rate of the Seaside City police is analyzed.
50This figure coincides with the numerous incidents,
related by the respondents, of suspects refusing to talk
due to legal advice not to do so, or befuddlement as the
result
of being issued the Miranda warnings.
51
See Table 3 supra.

TABLE 4
DETECIvE DESCRIPTION O 2F
OF INTERROGATION

PURPOSES

Seaside
City

New
Haven

32=

21

Stud

Purpose

Implicate accomplices
Solve other crimes
Recover stolen goods
Understand criminal motivation
General criminal intelligence
Eliminate narcotics sources
Remove weapons from circulation
Plea-bargaining
Help suspects clear selves
Detour suspects into other processes
Personal satisfaction
Public relations
Lecture youths and first offenders
Make good informant out of suspect
Be able to personally help the suspect by
knowing him better

Study

No.*

No.*

25
24
23
2
26
5
1

14
16
9
8
6
5
3
2
2
2
2
1
1

7
1
2
3

* The numbers are not mutually exclusive.
assumption has received some corroboration from
the data.
EFFECT OF THE MIRANDA DECISION ON THE PERCENTAGE OF STOLEN PROPERTY REcovERD

Another problem of grave concern for the respondents was what they perceived to be a decline
in their recovery rate of stolen property. They
attributed this decline to Miranda because of the
restrictions it imposes upon their talking to suspects. In contrast to the New -Haven Study where
only 9 per cent of the respondents felt that recovering stolen property was a reason for interrogation, 23 per cent of the respondents in the
Seaside City Study held this view. 2 From this
information it is possible to assume that, due to
the restraints imposed upon the interrogation
procedures by the Miranda requirements, the
police are recovering less stolen property.
From the figures in Table 6 it would appear
that if questioning suspects is a major criterion for
recovering stolen property, Miranda is having
little, if any, impact on the Seaside City police.
Over a ten-year period, the Seaside City police
- See Table 4 supra.

JAMES W. WITT

[Vol. 64

TABLE 5
ExTRA RESULTS FROM INTERROGATION (N = 478 CASES)
Pre-

Results(N=24(N=5)

Post-

Average Miranda Miranda
1968
1967
1966
=254)
(N224)n
(N=69) (N104)(N=120)

1964
(N=105)

1965
(N=80)

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

%

%

%

10
16
8
26
54

10
15
8
25
51

10
20
10
7
44

13
25
13
9
55

10
18
11
2
36

15
26
16
3
52

14
17
13
26
52

13
16
13
25
50

12
15
5
8
89

10
13
4
7
74

12
18
10
15
58

12.3
22.3
11.9
14.3
54.9

11.6
14.3
8.0
15.0
62.9

Implicate accomplices
Solve other crimes
Recover stolen property
Help suspect clear self
Nil

NOTE: Numbers and percentages are not mutually exclusive.
TABLE 6
PROPERTY-STOLEN AND RECOVERED

Property stolen*
Property recovered
Per cent of recovery

j

1960

1961

$420,327
34,872

$443,397
50,379

8%

11%

1962

1963

1964

$500,367
45,537
10%

1965

Property stolen*
Property recovered
Per cent of recovery

$894,440.
50,575

6%

$783,940
83,284
10%

$977,207
84,080

9%

* Stolen autos are not included in the above figures.
NOTE: Average rate of recovery for the above period = 10.6 per cent per year.

recovered an average of 10.6 per cent of their
stolen property each year. In the pre-Miranda
years, they recovered 10.7 per cent of their stolen
property. In the three post-Mirandayears, they
recovered the same amount-10.7 per cent. If the
15 per cent recovery rate in 1969 is not an aberration, an argument could be made that Miranda
has helped the recovery rate by requiring more
stringent investigation. This argument could gain
some support from the figures in Table 5 that
indicate a sharp decrease in the amount of stolen
property recovered through interrogation.

Regardless of how one chooses to interpret the
above data, the results do not seem to be consistent with the assumption.
CONVICTION RATE

The number of accused convicted at the trial
stage would seem to afford another indicator of
the impact of Miranda upon law enforcement
effectiveness. The respondents continuously cited

instances to the interviewer in which cases were
dismissed at the trial level due to some legal technicality. Many of these technicalities, according
to the respondents, had their roots in the Miranda
requirements. They also felt that limitations on
the interrogation procedures were keeping them
from building stronger cases at a time when they
were greatly needed. Therefore, one could assume
that procedural technicalities, emanating from
Miranda and Miranda'simpact upon the police's
efforts to build strong cases through interrogation,
have resulted in a decrease in the conviction
rate.
Table 7 contains the figures for all felony convictions in Seaside City for a nine-year period as
taken from the Department's annual reports.
Since the data regarding convictions were not
available in any other form, the total conviction
rate for these periods will be used for the purpose
of this study. Hence, the specific cases used in this
study are included in these figures. As evinced in
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TABLE 7
CoNvicTiON RATE
Guilty of a
SOtherwise

1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
Pre-Miranda

Acquitted or
Dismissed

% of Cases in
i of Cases in
Wch
Defendant
Which Defendant
Found
Guilty [Gulty
o a
Lesser Offense

115
65
67
31
30
40
48
38
28

67
80
61
91
70
64
80
65
60

12
17
9
14
12
6
20
20
25

94
90
93
90
89
95
87
84
78

36
53
48
50
70
62
54
63
68

348

423

70

92

55

114

205

65

83

64

(1961-66)
Totals
Post-Miranda
Totals

Table 7, there was a 9 per cent drop in the conviction rate-from 92 per cent of 841 cases in the
pre-Miranda years to 83 per cent of 384 cases in
the pQst-Mirandaperiod. Other figures reveal that
64 per cent of the 83 per cent of those found guilty
in the post-Miranda period were found guilty of
lesser offenses. This is in contrast to the 55 per
cent in the pre-Mirandaperiod.D
In testing the above assumption, the figures
contained in Table 8- reveal that in most of the
478 cases examined in this study, there was very
strong evidence against the accused when he went
to trial. When this fact is added to the remarks
made by many of the interviewees chiding the
district attorney's office for prosecuting only
"sure" cases, the above assumption appears to be
55
somewhat doubtful.
The above facts in conjunction with the data
from Table 2, showing that interrogation was

TABLE 8
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
Witness

Police
Complainant as witness
Eyewitness
Expert
Alleged confession or admission
Family and friends of complainant
Accomplice-turned state's evidence
Other witnesses

Seas'Ide
City

17°w
Haven

59
34
22
18
43
5
5
20

78
57
25
25
19
18
9
7

NOTE: Percentages indicate the per cent of cases
each source of evidence was utilized. Since each case
might contain several sources, the percentages will not
total 100.
necessary in only 24 per cent of the cases handled

" The Pittsburgh Study reported a decline of .4 per by the Seaside City police, would indicate that
cent in the conviction rate in the post-Mirandaperiod only strong cases reached the trial stage. With the
in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. See Seeburger &
outcome of the case at the trial level being deWettick, supra note 18, at 19.
" The format for this table was taken from Inter- pendent upon such imponderables as attorneys'
rogation in New Haven, supra note 18, at 1580.
61The fact that District Attorney Younger is in- acumen, judges' attitudes, jury capriciousness
formed in the matter can be seen in a comment from and witness availability, it would be difficult to
his study. Upon acknowledging that his office's con- attribute a drop in the conviction to a specific
viction rate had dropped 10.2 per cent due to the exclusion of several confessions with consequential ac- court decision or, for that matter, court decisions
quittals, Mr. Younger remarked, "Since each of these generally.
22 cases was filed prior to Miranda,we can anticipate
Table 7 also reveals that 9 per cent more accused
that this same problem will not occur when cases filed
after Miranda reach the superior court." See Younger, have been convicted of lesser offenses in the postsupra note 18, at 38-39.
Miranda years. From the data available to this
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TABLE 9
CLEARANCE RATE-CRIME-SEASiDE CITy
Murder

Rape

Robbery

Totals

50

0.0

,,

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1960-66
Total
1967-69
Total

Burglary

21-0

5
1
5
5
6
7
1
3
7
4

4
1
4
5
5
7
1
3
5
4

80
100
80
100
83
100
100
100
71
100

6
11
20
19
26
12
11
31
54
66

3
6
12
10
13
6
0
16
14
30

50
55
60
53
50
50
0
52
27
46

78
136
127
117
149
150
154
169
254
229

42
47
39
37
38
58
48
27
46
37

54
35
31
32
26
39
31
16
18
16

826
866
992
971
1102
1207
1086
1419
1698
1736

110
304
225
176
129
223
133
250
253
232

13
35
23
18
12
18
12
18
15
13

905
1014
1144
1112
1283
1376
1252
1622
2011
2035

159
358
280
228
185
294
182
296
318
303

18
35
24
21
14
21
15
18
16
15

30

27

90

105

50

48

911

309

34

7850

1300

17

8896

1686

19

14

12

86

149

60

40

652

110

17

4853

735

15

5668

917

16
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researcher, it was not possible to ascertain to what
extent this figure was affected by Mirazda. However, allowing that the Miranda requirements
could possibly contribute to this increase, there
would seem to be two more plausible explanations
for this situation. First, there could be a substantial degree of plea bargaining56 being practiced
by the prosecutors. This could result from incompetent or overtaxed prosecutors or by the simple
fact that the court system itself is too strained to
handle the cases.
Second, the prosecutor's office might have the
tendency to reduce charges in cases where the
conviction of a felony could involve grave additional problems for the accused, to circumvent a
mandatory minimum sentence, or to avoid a
community obloquy that could be affixed to an
accused convicted of certain offenses.
To test this assumption adequately, one would
have to examine each case in which an accused
was found not guilty or guilty of a lesser offense
and tabulate the reasons for these results. Since
these data were not available, the evidence for
the above assumption would have to be deemed
inconclusive.

5 6This refers to the procedure whereby the prosecutor
and defense counsel will negotiate an agreement by
which the accused pleads guilty either of a lesser charge
or for a more desirable sentence recommendation by
the prosecutor.

Again, most of the respondents were quick to
refer to a decline in their clearance rate when
discussing problems emanating from the Miranda
decision. Other police officials have expressed the
same concern,51 and justification for these apprehensions can be found in the UNuoni CRiME
REPORTS. In the years 1960-1968 the Crime Index
rose 122 per cent, but the Clearance Rate declined
to -32 per cent.59 Hence, one could assume that
the clearance rate is adversely affected by court
decisions which limit the police's ability to question
suspects about crimes--crimes which they might
have committed other than the one for which
they are charged.
Table 9 sets forth the complete figures for the
clearance rates of the crimes dealt with in this
study over a ten-year period of time. These data
were obtained from the annual reports of the
7 This refers to ".... the percentage of crimes known
to the police which the police believe have been
'solved'." See SKoLNicx, JusTicE WITHoUT TRIAl 168
(1966). It is one of the means used by the police to
measure their effectiveness.
0'The Deputy Commissioner for Community Relations of the New York City Police Department attributed a 10 per cent decline in their clearance rate to
Supreme Court decisions in the N. Y. Times, February
21, 1967, at 36, col. 3.

59See CR

11-1THE UNITED STATES: UNMORM

Cani Rx rTs, 32 (1968). During this period the
population rose 11 per cent.
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Seaside City Police Department and were available in no other form. The cases utilized in the
present undertaking are included in these totals.
As the figures in Table 960 indicate, the clearance
rate for the Seaside City police did drop 3 per
cent in the post-Miranda period. Furthermore,
the chart shows that the decline has affected all
four categories of crimes used for this analysis."
However, the decline did not begin in the 1966
Miranda year; in fact, the clearance rate actually
rose 3 per cent in the first year following Miranda
with subsequent decreases. If Miranda did have
an adverse effect on the clearance rate, it is reasonable to assume that it would be reflected in the
1967 figures. Since this was not the case, it would
be hard to assume that arevival of the pre-Miranda
interrogation procedures would rally the clearance
rate.
It would seem that any decline in the clearance
rate could not be totally attributed to Miranda.
Factors such as increased police workloads without
commensurate increases in manpower, increasing
criminal mobility and the plain fact that the
police are interrogating fewer people would have
to be taken into consideration in any valid analysis
of the clearance rate.
Even though crimes can be cleared through
interrogation, many authorities question the use
of the clearance rate as a means to measure law
enforcement efficiency.! In many instances the
suspect will help the police solve other crimes as
a means of mitigating his own circumstances;
therefore, what is accomplished? The case has
usually been lying dormant in the pending file
and the stolen property, if any, is seldom recovered.
The data above would appear to lend some
corroboration to the assumption being tested.
The police do clear crimes by questioning people.
Therefore, if the Miranda decision causes the
60
This table is modeled after one used in the Pittsburgh Study. See Seeburger & Wettick, supra note
18,6at 21.
1In the Pittsburgh Study it was found that the postMiranda clearance rate exceeded the pre-Mirandarate
by 1.4 per cent. Id. at 21.
12For general criticism of dependence upon police
statistics, see Shulman, The Measurement of Crime in
thIe United States, 57 J. CRn. L. C. & P.S. 483 (1966).
For criticism of the clearance rate specifically, see
Foote, Law and PolicePractice,52 Nw. UXL. Rzv. 23-24
(1957); Kasimar, On the Tactics of Police Prosecution
Oriented Critics of the Court, 49 CoaurnE L.Q. 466-67
(1964); Pye, supra note 6, at 412-13; Skolnick, supra
note A at 168-81; Interrogationin New Haven, supra
note 18, at 1596.

police to interrogate fewer people, either through
indolence or fear of losing their principal case on
technicalities, then Miranda does affect the dearance rate. This conclusion must be guarded because it is possible that the trend in the clearance
rate may change. One could conclude from the
above data, as did Pye in his article,".. .that the
data now available do not support the repeated
assertions that the right to interrogate is a panacea
for a dropping clearance rate."' 6
From the results of the Seaside City Study, one
would have to conclude that Miranda's impact
on the effectiveness of law enforcement in that
area has been meager. It is highly improbable
whether any true analysis of Miranda's impact
on law enforcement can be made from data like
that presented above. If Miranda has had an
impact, this would be more likely to show up at
the filing stage" of the legal proceedings and these
data are not available for analysis. Also, and very
importantly, there is no way of determining how
many cases never reach the filing stage due to the
impact of Miranda.
The available studies of this problem, including
the immediate study, are limited both in size and
implication. However, none suggests the thesis
that the confession decisions are fossilizing the
interrogation process. Although the results of this
study do not lend themselves to generalization,
they do seem to suggest reservations about any
unqualified claim that interrogation is valueless.
CONCLUSIONS
The crucial problem of attaining a balance between individual rights and societal interests lies
at the heart of the controversy over post-arrest
interrogation. The solution to this problem cannot
be found in the Framers' intent or in abstract
theories of individual rights. It must be found in
the context of the times. Normally, in a representative democracy, the development of systems
of criminal procedure is the prerogative of the
legislature; however, in the United States, the
judiciary, on occasion, has been charged with
this task. This study was initiated to evaluate the
impact that the handiwork of the judiciary has had
upon the effectiveness of the police.
64 See Pye, supra note 6, at 412.
1 This is the stage where the police present their case
to the district attorney and he decides whether there is
enough evidence for trial. By being restricted in their
interrogation procedures, the police could be restrained
from building a strong enough case for trial.

JAMES W. WITT

What has been the impact of the Miranda decision on police effectiveness? A review of the various
studies dealing with the topic indicates that the
impact of Miranda has been slight. In the immediate study it was found that even though the
officers conceived interrogation to be essential in
solving most crimes, it was actually necessary in
only about one quarter of the cases surveyed.
Furthermore, an analysis of 478 cases by the
author produced very little indication that the
Miranda requirements had materially affected
the outcome of formal police interrogation, or any
other factors such as the recovery of stolen
property. Even though there had been a decline
in both the conviction and clearance rates of the
Seaside City Police Department, for the reasons
set forth in this study one would be hard pressed to
attribute those declines specifically to Miranda.
Interrogation performs many collateral functions for the police. It is here that the impact of
Miranda was more distinct. The police were found
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to be implicating fewer accomplices, clearing
fewer crimes and recovering less property through
interrogation, and helping fewer suspects clear
themselves. Therefore, the writer concludes that
the impact of Miranda on law enforcement in the
jurisdiction studied was slight. This substantiates
the findings of related studies. The results do not
support the thesis that police interrogation is
unnecessary.
In order to balance the scale upon which rest
the rights of the individual and the interests of
society, the proponents in each camp will have to
realize that they are playing a game of give-andtake. Those championing the rights of the individual must be ready to sacrifice some individual
rights and liberties in order to foster a type of
society in which all can enjoy a certain measure
of rights. On the other hand, those championing
the cause of society must understand that police
efficiency has to yield on occasions to the rights
and liberties of the individual.

